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I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N.

In
rily

an essay of this kind,which must necessa-

be somewhat limited i#

scope,

it

would be inex-

pedient to endeavor to cover the whole field of the law
of trespass or of trover, therefore the writer has directed his attention to the salient characteristics
of each action, to those points which are most important and interesting,not only from their prominence,but
also from the fact that they are somewhat unsettled.
It is the purpose of the writer to present a
comparison of the modern actions of trespass and trover as they now exist ,the distinction abolished in
but still

having some influence

form,

on the Imr and practice.

2
The discussion may be largely historical,
theoretical or otherwise inpractical,but still of some
importance;

as a landmark is

always interesting,and all

the more so when it is gradually disappearing,so these
two actions may have some interest to the student of
to-day.
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Chapter

I.

T R E S P A S S.
In dealing with rights of action arising out
of injuries done to property,moveable and tangible in
its

nature,i.e. personalty,there are two things to be

considered;

the nature of the wrongful act ,and

first,

secondly,the right infringed by such act.
It

is

clear that he who without authority or

right damages or takes a chattel belonging to another,
is guilty of a wrong,and equally clear that the owner
of that chattel is

entitled to a remedy.

To the

person so wronged,the law gives the choice of four socalled 'possessory actions' ,namely,'replevin'

to recover

the chattel,'detinue' to recover damages for the detention of the chattel,'trespass'

to recover damages for

the caption and detention of the chatteland
recover for the detention alone.

'trover'

to

It is with trover

and trespass that we are to dealand first

of trespass.

Trespass is one of the oldest of the common
law actions known as possessory actions,and

in its

origin was an action to recover damages for an unlawiul interference with real property.

There being

no adequate remedy for a like disturbance of personal
property,the scheme of using trespass as a means of
remedy was devised and came into general use.
Of trespasses to personalty there are
kinds:first ,those trespasses whereby the possession
of the owner was disturbed or interfered with,but there
was no change of possessionwhere the act amounted to
a disturbance of but not a deprivation of the owner's
possession, and secondly,those trespasses where the
interference or disturbance amounted to an actaual charge
of possession,where there was an actual caption and
transportation of the goods,called under the old forms
cepit et asportavit and giving rise to the action of
trespass de bonis asportatis.
Those trespasses in which there is

not the

element of conversion or asportation,are not within
our subject ,therefore,hereafter,in speaking of trespasses we shall refer to those cases only in

which the oyrn-

5
er is

deprived of his goods ;where the asportation or

conversion is part of the injury complained of.
the early conmnon law ,force was an essen-

In
tial

part of the injury of trespass.

Trespass at

that time was an interference with property,not
unlawful and unauthorizedbut also by force

only

and ams

(vi et armis) ,and under the early forms the plaintiff
must allege and prove ,not only the fact of the taking,
but also that the taking was by force,that is,against
his will.

However ,the natural development of the

action brought with it
and it

the idea of constructive force,

became sufficient to prove a taking,first against

the will, and then without the consent of the owner,active

force being alleged only to recover vindictive

damages.
In the modern practice the rule is even less
strict.

It

is

now sufficient to allege that the

disturbance of possession was unlawful or without justification.

This,for the reason that the gist of

the action is the disturbance of possession and whether

6
the caption is
tial

forcible or not ,is

to the injury though it

of aggravation.

is

It

a matter not essen-

may be proved as a matter

now substantially correct to

say that any unauthorised exercise of dominion over the
chattel of another is

a trespass.

So in Miller vs

Baker(a) ,the defendant,a sheriff,hact unlawfully attached the goods of the plaintiff;

the goods had not been

actually disturbedthe sheriff merely placing a keeper
in

charge with directions not to allow their removal,

yet he was held liable in

trespass.

court quotes the words of Sewall J. in
"No actual force is

In

the opinion the

Gibbs vs Chase(b):

necessary to be proved.

He,who in-

terferes with my chattels ,and without delivery by me,
and without my consent ,undertakes to dispose of them as
having the property,general or special,does so at his
peril to answer me in

damages in

trespass or trover".

And in Hardy vs Clendering it is held(c):that trespass
will lie against one who knowingly purchases goods at an
illegal execution sale.
(a)
(b)
(c)

I Met. 27
10 Mass .128.
25 Ar k.436.
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In the case of an actual taking,it is even
unnecessary that the defendant have a wrongful intent,
it is sufficient if the plaintiff show that the act
was done without justifiable
mistake or accident.

cause,even though b7

In Hobart vs Haggett(a),the

defendant ,having purchased an ox from the plaintiff,
was directed to take it from the enclosure,and,by mistake,taking the w rong animal',was held liable in
pass therefor.

So in

tres-

Guille vs Swan(b) ,the leading

case on this pointJudge Spencer says:"The intent with
which the act is cormitted is by no means the test of
the liability of the defendant in an action of trespass.
If the act caused the inmvediate injury ,whether intentional or unintentional,trespass is the proper remedy
to redress the wrong.

What is essentially a tres-

pass cannot become lawful because of its

having been

done with a good intention; neither can the manner of
doing it affect it; if unlawful in its nature ,it must
continue so".
(a)
(b)

And the same rule applies in trover

12 Me. 67.
19 Johns 381; See also Higginson v Yorke,
5 Mass .381 and Coal Co. vs McOulloch,54 Md.40W

as will be seen later.
But that is not a trespass which consists
merely in some injury done to property by one to whom
for any purpose the property has been entrusted by the
owner and who was at the time lavfully holding it(a)
But a possession obtained by fraud and for the very
purpose of the wrong,is not such a lawful possession as
will protect the trespasser, therefore an injury to the
chattel,while such a possession continues,is a trespass,
so in Butler vs Collins(b) ,where the defendant obtained
possession of the goods by fraud intending to convert
them and did convert them,the court held that it was as
much a trespass as if the possession had been gained
by forceand the defendant was held liable in trespass.
So also the possession may have been gained
larrfully,with no intent to convert the goods,but while
the goods are in the possession of the defendant,he may
by wrongfully dealing with them,render himself a trespasser under the doctrine of "trespass ab initio".
But in

this doctrine there is

(a)

21 Pick.401.

(b)

12 Cal. 457.

the distinction

9
drawn by the courts between a possession gained 'by authority of law'
i.e.

and a possession 'by authority

license of the owner.

in

fact',

This distinction was es-

tablished by the Six Carpenters Case,(a) where the
is

stated substantially as follows:--

ity is

rule

here an author-

given to one by law,and he abuses it,he will be-

come a trespasser ab initio,because

abuses are so easi-

ly committed under guise of legal authority that the
owner of goods nust have some protection against one of
whom he knows nought and to whom he is
to deliver his chattels.
protection fail

fact .the rule is

by any subsequent
him of its

another,whereforeas to authority

that the license cannot

protection(b).

Trespass is

as to who may maintain tres-

based on possession,therefore

would seem that the plaintiff
(a)
(b)

be annulled

act of the licensee so as to deprive

Our next topic is
pass.

But th e reasons for this

when the owner has of his own volition

intrusted his goods to
in

obliged by law

it

must have had po -session

1 Smiths Lead.Ca--257. & noteb
Allen vs Crowfoot,5 XVend.506,;Wendell vs Johnson,8 N.H.220; State v Monroe ,12 11.71.42;Hammond vs Hobart ,42 Me .565;Vanlrunt v Schenck,
13 Johns ,414;Narehood vs Y$ilhelmn,69 Pa.St .64
Barrett vs White,14 Am .Dec.352 & Yote,365.
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either actual or constructive ,or,as it

is

better stated,
That

possession or the inmnediate right of possession.

the rule requires either one or the other is clearly
laid down in

the case Ward vs McCaulay(a) ,

In that

case ,the plaintiffbeing the owner of a house and furniture ,leased the same to Lord Montfort for a term of
years.

Before the expiration of the term the

de-

fendant converted the furniture ,seizing it under an
illegal

brings trespass.

The plaintiff

attachment.

Lord Kenyon,in sustaining the defendant's demurrer,says:
"The distinction between trespass and trover is
settled.

The former is founded on possession,the lat-

ter on property ....... When the plaintiff
sion,his remedy is
his property in
is

well

by an action in

has no posses

trover founded on

the goods taken instead of trespass which

founded on possession".

And his Lordship further

observes "To enable a man to bring trespass,he nmst
at the time -Then the act was con~nitted which constitutes the trespass,either have the actual physical posses(a)

-

4 Trm Rep.

487.
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sion or else he must have the constructive possession
in

respect to the right of possession being actually

vested in

him" .

Judge Cooley,in his treatise on

tortsadopts the same view.

He says:"The possession

may be either actual or constructive.

The right to the

possession of a chattel draws to it in contemplation
of lawv,the possession itself,so that one party may
be entitled to sue on his actual possession,while
ther may sue on his constructive possession.

ano-

Thus,

though a bailee or mortgagor who is left in possession
of chattels may bring suit against one who disturbs his
possessionstill if the mortgagee or bailor is of right
entitled to demand and take possession at any time,
this right draws to it the possession,and the wrongdoer is a trespasser In him also(a)".

The whole

doctrine rests either upon possession or right to
possession,so that a bailor,who has the right to demand and take possession at any time,may maintain trespass,while a lessor for years,whose right to take possession is postponed until the expiration of the lease,
(a)

Cooley on Tort s,p .439 .

may not(a)

For convenience and brevity,other topics relating to trespass will be discussed in

succeeding

chapters.

(a) Edwards v-do,ll Vermont,537; Woodruff v
Halsey ,8 Pick.333; Bass v Pearce 16 Barb.595;
Staples vs Smith,48 Me .470; Faulkner vs
Brown,13 Wendell, 53.

Chapter

II.

TR OVER.
The action of trover is

an outgrowth of,and

a great improvement upon,the old conmon la=
detinue which it

action of

has largely supplanted by reason of

the greater simplicity of pleading in

trover,and the

avoidance of several annoying and useless incidents of
detinue.
Lord Mansfield in

Cooper vs Chilly(a) ,says

of trover:"In form the action is a fiction,in substance
it

is

a remedy to recover the value of chattels,wrong-

fully converted to his own use by the defendant".
corTnon law,the form supposes that the plaintiff
come lvf

At

may have

ully into possession of the chattel,and the

declaration counts ipon the fact that the plaintiff
lost--and the defendant found--the
upon demand to deliver it
sent practice,generally
loss and finding is
(a)

'i

lo-

chattel,and refuses

to the owner.

Under the pre-

by statute,the fiction of the

abolished,and as a general rule ,the
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question of how the defendant
the chattels is

came into possession of

not material at coninon law and not tra-

ver sable.
And herein lies the conmon law distinction
bet-reon trespass and trover.
gist of the trespass is

Under the old forms,the

the vrongful violation or dis-

turbance of the possession, while in

trover,

the gist

of the action was, not the manner of taking nor the taking wrongful or otherwise,but was the fact that the
defendant ,having gained the possession,how it

matters

not ,refuses to redeliver the chattel to the rightful
owner,and thereby the plaintiff
damages.
trespass ,is

is

injured and asks

That the wrongful caption is

the gist of

clearly shown by the facts that the chief

allegation in the old forms is the wrongful caption,the
loss by conversion being merely consequential )thereof,
and in

addition ,that.if

the defendant

gained possession

lawfully,trespass would not lie at all except in the
few cases included in

the doctrine of trespass ab initio.

On the other hand in trover the detention is the chief
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allegation,the manner of gaining possession being presumed lawful.
follows: in

The distinction may be surrmed up as

tresspass the action is

founded on the ac-

quisition of property by the defendant; in

trover,on

the deprivation of the plaintiff.
The wrong for which trover is
technically

brought is

called conversion,and the term

-

Conversion

is

called "an unfortunate expression" by Baron Martin

in

Burroughs v Bayne(a) .

is

an"unfortunate one", and "conveys no impression to

But,though the expression

the mind" of the learned Baron,yet ,in
it

is

tc

the nind of the modern lawryer the substance of the

lt

a most important

modern practice

and far reaching tern,and conveys

regarding remedies for the asportation of personal

property.
Conversion according to Judge Bramwell in
Hiort v Bott,(b) is the wrong done by "an unauthorized
act which deprives another of his property permanently
or for an indefinite period": or as was said in
v Paige(c),is
(a)
(b)
(c)

McPheters

"any act of dominion exercised over pro-

5 H. & N. 802.
L.R.9 Ex.86 & 39.
83 Me.234.
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perty in denial of the owner's right or inconsistent
with it".

In the time of Lord Mansfield,conversion

was as he states in Cooper vs Chilly(antd)

"the diver-

sion of another's property to ones own use".

But

this limited meaning of the ten has long been left
behind in trover (though it still obtains in trespass)
for it csme to be seen that the diversion to ones own
use was not the chief aspect of the wrong,--for what
matters it

to the plaintiff who gets the benefit of the

property ,he was deprived of it

and what he wated was

recompense for that deprivation.?

What matters it

to the plaintiff whether his property was converted to
the use of the person wvho first took it,or
of a third person to whom he delivered it?

to the use
So that

in trover,the plaintiff may sue,not only the person
who first converted his goods,but also any other person
to whom the goods were delivered,and the defences of
"purchase without notice" or "innocent bailee" are of
no avail.

The advantage to the defendant is

test ,that is the loss of the plaintiff.

not the

17
with

The proposition that persons deal

chattels,or exercise dominion over them at their own
risk,is well settled iA our law and the rule applies
very generally(a).
not apply.

But in trespass this rule does

Pollock says(b):"One who received goods

from a trespasser,even with fall knowledge,does not hiself become a trespasser against the real owner,as he
has not violated an existing possession".
so stated,seems a little
it

is

too broad at the present day:

better stated by Judge Porter in

(c) :"It is

The rule

Brooks v Olmsteed

no doubt true that one who comes to the pos-

session of goods by delivery,and who has been guilty
of no fraud on his part ,although it may turn out that
the person who made the delivery to him had no title,
and was himself a wrongdoer, yet, the receiver,guilty
of no fault,

cannot be treated as a trespasser;

such a case he had done no act which aided in

for in

depriv-

ing the true owner of his property ...... he is neverthe(a)

(b)
(c)

McPheters vs Paige,ante. Hoofman v Carow,20
'Jend.21;Coles v Clark ,3 Cush.399 ;Robinson v
Bird,153 Mass .357; Arkel v Waterman,63 Cal.34;
Spraights v Holley,39 N.Y.441; Rice v Yocum,
155 Pa.St .538.
Pol-lock on Torts,454.
17 Pa.St.27.

less liable in trover ........ So it may be stated safely that he who buys property from a trespasser without
any knowledge of the original trespass cannot be treated as a trespasser(a)".
From the foregoing it may be said that the
plaintiff in trover may pursue his goods and recover
damages from any one to whom they were delivered or into
whose hands they have come,while the plaintiff in trespass can sue only the original wrongdoer and those who
by an unlawful taking frolh that wrongdoer have become
liable to him in

trespass~a) .

The question as to who may maintain troveris
in

an unsatisfactory condition.

On principle it

would seem that the person having title

to goods should

be allowed to maintain this action whether he had actual possession or
not.

an immediate right to possession,or

And indeed in Ward vs McCaulay(ante) that seems

to be the opinion of Lord Kenyon.

In the early his-

tory of the lav of trover,the rule was so stated as to
(a)

Brooks v Olmstead,ante. Gloss v Black,91 Pa.St
418; Ehle v do,5 Comstock,506; Stanley v Gaylord ,I Cueh.556.
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be misleading,for it was then said "that to maintain
trover the plaintiff must show a legal title or a proprietary right".

And from the decisions on this

point the followin, rule may be deduced: to maintain
trover the plaintiff rust have had at the time of the
alleged wrong a propertygeneral or special,entitling
him to possession,or possession(a).
It was long in dispute whether bare possession
was sufficient to support an action of trover; under
the old forms it clearly was not ,-title of some kind
must have been coupled with the possession.

The

rule was settled finally in the leading case of Armory
vs Delamirie(b) ,where the finder of a jewel was allowed to maintain trover against one to whom he had delivered it for examination,and who refused to return it.
In the case of Gulf Co. vs Johnson(c),Justice Caldwell
of the Supreme Court of the United States observed:
"The presumption of law is that the person who has possession,has the property,

and the law All not permit

Hunter vs Cronkhite ,36 N.E.924. Jaggard on
Torts,710; Ins.Co. v Drury ,38 Md.242-49;
Cooley on Torts,ante.
(b). 1 Strange,505; Smiths Lead.Cas .
t-

(a)

(c)

~L 'FO.C

I .
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that presumption to be rebutted by evidence that the
property is

in

a third person, when the evidence is

offered by one who claims no title and who is a wrongdoer" .
And in the same case the court observes: "In
the laxv of trespass the jus tertii cannot be asserted,
and in this respect I

can see no practical difference

between trespass and trover,for the general presumption
of law is

In

pertyff.
held in

that he who has the possession has the proaccordance with this

decisionit

is

New York(a) ,that trover will lie on a bare pos-

session,and that a defendant in trover cannot set up
title in a third person without showing in himself some
claim,title or interest derived from such third person.
From what has been said heretofore it

thus appears that

there is no practical difference between trespass and
trover as to the statut of the plaintiff,--in either
case he must have had possession or constructive possession in order to succeed(b).
(a)

(b)

Darnes vs Ball,ll Wend.57;Dancan vs Spear,
11 Wend.54; See also Harker v Dement,9 Gill,
9 & 12; Knap v Winchester,ll Vt .351; Bartlett
vs Hoit,29 N.H.317;
.
R'y Co. vs Kidd,7 Dana,245.
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The next point to be determined is,what amounts
to a conversion?

In

general it

may be said that any

dominion exercised over a chattel without authority of
the owner,and inconsistent with his right,is

a conversion

sufficient to maintain trover(a); and of trespass de
bonis asportatis it

may be said that any unlawful tak-

ing and asportation of the goods is
tain trespass(b).

sufficient to main-

The only difference is the added

element of the unlawful caption or taking in

trespass

Under the old forms the distinction was even
wider,for then the element of force was necessary in
trespass;--there must have been a taking (vi et annis)
or constructively violent, while in trover the taking
or getting possession was indisputably presumed to be
lawful,the wrong following when the owner demanded possession and it was refused;

But though force as a

requisite ,has ceased to be a necessary 0a1legation in
trespass(b),
(a)
(b)

"and it

has frequently been decided that

See Fouldes vs Willoughby ,8 M. & W. 540;
Dexter vs Cole, 6 Wis.320.
Dexter vs Cole,supra.
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to maintain trespass it is not necessary to prove forcible dispossession,but evidence of any unlawiful interference with,or exercise of act of dominion over,
property,to the exclusion of the owner,is sufficient to
maintain the action;--yet the old idea of vi et armis
has had a strong influence on the lar
with its

of trespass,and

consequent idea of personal injury ,has pre-

vented the expansio; of the action

and has limited its

application to that class of cases where the possession
is

obtained unlawfully,or being obtained lawfully,was

rendered unlawful by subsequent acts of the defendant.
Trover,on the other hand,based on the elastic idea of detention, utterly disregarding the method
of gaining possession,has gradually widened its

juris-

diction and slowly but surely,as the sea gradually encroaches upon and covers the land,has finally covered
all those cases where one person withholds the property
of another and the latter sues to recover damages for a
detention or conversion.

And moreover this all con-

quering trover has swallowed the jurisdiction of its

23
action,and now may be maintained in

sister

where trespass

de bonis asportatis will lie;

tiffwaive the tort and sue in
sion(a).

all cases
the plain-

trover for the conver-

Judge Morton observes(b) : 'the tort ibus

taking of personal property is

a

conversion of it,and

trover will lie wherever trespass de bonis asportatis
will lie'.
However,the converse of the rule does not apply; for

trover

lies wherever the defendant is wrong-

fully in possession of the plaintiff's property or when
he has converted it to his own use or another'sno matter how he cene into the possession; but trespass lies
only when the possession is

gained unlvfully ,or when

a defendant is a trespasser ab initio: in the first case
must show unlavful detention only,

plaintiff

he must also show unlavful caption:

in

trespass

and therein lies

the chief distinction between trespass and trover in
theory,in practice and in
(a)
(b)

measure of damages.

Pierce vs Berryman,14 Pick.356.
Ibid.
Oxley vs Watts,l T.R.12; Attack
vs Brarwrell,3 B.520.
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In

tools from one part of his land to

the plaintiff's
another in

Shea vs Milford(a) ,the defendant removed

consequence of which they were lost ,and

the plaintiff sues in trover.

The plaintiff in re-

moving the goods had no intent to convert them,and was
held not liable in

trover there being in

fact no con-

But the court intimated that the defendant

version.

might be liable in

trespass for there it

is

sufficient to

prove an unlavful disturbance,and the damages for the
loss of the tools would follow as consequential damages.
The plaintiff
and sue in

trover may waive the tort

but trespass is

not so convertible

That is,if it is a mere naked trespass,if there

(b).
is

assunsit,

in

may,

a trespass de bonis asportatis the plaintiff

because he may waive the trespass and sue in

trover,sue

on an implied assumpsit.
In

Grafton vs Carmichael(c),the

question be-

came important as to whether the action was in
(a)
(b)
(c)

145 Mass. 125.
Finnigan vs Dowers,59 N. W. 981.
48 Wis. 660.

the

25
the court did not

nature of trespass or of trove r,for
recognize the 'doctrine

of trespass ab initio as appliIf

cable to the case.
plaintiff
says:

recovdr,but

if

the action is

trespass he can't.

"The gravemen of the charge is

lawful taking.

trover,the

The defendant

The court

a wrongful and un-

justified under an attach-

ment which afterwards proved to be invalid.
tiff

cannot maintain trespass;

if

it

The plain-

had been trover

the result would have been otherwise".
Bushall vs
the distinction

iller(a),is

another case

became important.

tain goods to the plaintiff

A.intrusted cer-

who placed them in

occupied by himself- and the defendant in
that they were in

in which

a hut

such a place

the way of the defendant.

The de-

fendant removed them and they were lost ,and the plaintiff

having made satisfaction to A,brings this action.

The court decided that the defendant was not liable for
the conversion though he might be for the trespass.
The cases above cited illustrate
(a)

I Strange,128.

the propo-
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sition that even where the distinction between forms
has been abolished by statute ,there still
distinction in practical effect.

remains a

Chapter III.

IMASURE

OF

DAMAGES .

We have now come to the measure of dwmage s,
the most important topic from a practical point of view,
in our discussion.
topic,

it

is

In the consideration of this

not my intention to cover the whole field

of the measure of samage in

either action;

I shall con-

fine myself,as far as possibleto those points where a
distinction exists or is thought to exist ,between the
two actions and if
because it

I digress into other topics it

is

seems necessary.
Remembering the theory at common law that

in trespass there are two elements of injury,namely,
the wrongful taking and the asportation,and in

trover

only one element of injury,the deprivation of possession, it

would seem that therein will lie any distinc-

tion that might exist between the measures of danage

28
in the two actions.

I apprehend that under the

old forms such was the case; that in trespass the plaintiff might allege and recover damages for the taking(if
only nominal) and also the value of the chattel if he
were deprived of the possession,while in trover he could,
recover damages only for the deprivation of possession
the value of the chattel.

So Lord Mansfield says

of trover: "The form supposes that he came by it lawfully(the chattels in suit);yetif he did not,by bringing this action(trover),--the plaintiff waives the trespass; no damages are recoverable for the act of taking,
all must be for the act of conversion" (.a) .

It would

seem from this that the chief practical distinction lay
in this very fact, that in trespass,the plaintiff could
compensate himself not only for the loss of the chattel,
but he might also,by getting vindictive damages,be repaid and the defendant punished for the wrongful taking.
But this distinction seems to have almost
disappeared from the present practice,by what process
I do not know,unless it is due to the combined influ(a)

Cooper vs Chilly, ante.
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ences of permitting trover to be substituted for trespass ,the tendency of courts to make the measure of damages uniform in all tort actions ,the tendency to give
exemplary damages in all tort actions,alike,only when
there aggravating circumstances,and lastly the abolishing of the distinctions in form by the legislature in
the simplification of procedure and practice.
In Forsyth vs YTells(a),the court says:"It is
apparent that this view would transfer to the plaintiff
all the defendant's labor ,and thns give her more than
compensation for the injury done.

Yet we adnit the

accuracy of this conclusion,if we may properly base
our reasoning on the form rather than on the principle
or purpose of the remedy.

But this we may not do,and

especially we may not sacrifice the principle to the
very form by which we are endeavoring to enforce it;
....... but still ,the fact that the form is for the sake
of the principle ,and not the principle for the sake of
the form,requires that the form shall not now rule the
principle" .
(a)

'A
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The case of Concrd vs Insurance Co.,(a) ihas
had an important bearing on the abolition of the distinction between the two actions.
says:

The court there

"The rule which ought to govern juries in

as-

sessing damages for injuries to personal property,
depends much on the circumstances of each case.....but
where an individual
siders a

acting in

pursuance of what he con-

just claim to property,

process to enforce it ,causes

proceeds by legal

a levy to be made on what

is claimed by another ,without abusing or perverting its
objects (referring to the legal process) there is and
ought to be a different rule

(speaking of the rule giv-

ing exemplary damages in trespass) ....... If the plaintiff
in an action of trespass,succeed,he is entitled to legal
satisfaction for the injury sustained by the taking and
detention in cases not attended with circumstances of
aggravation.

The general rule of damages is the value

of the property ',ith interest.

This is generally

considered the extent of the injury sustained,on this
is deemed legal compensation,which refers solely to the
(a) UQ .

I . - I.L
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injury done to the property so taken,and not to any
collateral and consequential danages resulting to the
These are taken into con-

owner by the trespass.
sideration only in

a

case more or less aggravated"

It followsin all cases in tort under the
new procedure and the modern rulings thereunder,where
no question of malice intervenes,that the measure of
relief does not depend upon the form of the action,that
the measure of damages is detemrined,in all cases where
the facts are similar,without regard to the form of the
action,by fixed rules varying somewhat in different
jurisdictions ,according to the view of the courts in
each jtrisdiction.

These varying rules are all based

upon the broad general principle that the danages ,except where there are aggravating circustances,should
simply compensate the plaintiff

for the loss of his

chattel.
And so in

Wylie vs Shitherman(a) ,the court

says: "The proper measure of damages in

actions of this

kind(trespass) ,is the real value of the property de(a)

8 Ired. 236; Also,Dibble vs Morris,26 Conn.
416; Forsyth vs Wells,anteo%
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stroyed,unless the trespass is
maliciously ,in

committed wantonly or

which case the jury mayif they think

proper ,give vindictive damages".
And in

conformity with the foregoing it

has

also been decided that when trespass is brought for personal property and no circunstances of aggravation are
shown,the action for the purpose of measuring the damage,
is to be regarded as similar to conversion(a).

The

general rule in each case is the value at the time the
act was con-mitted with interest to the date of the trial:
and here a distinction may be drawm.

In trespass,

according to this rule,the value would be estimated at
the time of the trespass,that is,when the taking commenced,or when the defendant exercised dominion over
the chattels unlawfully(b) .

Ordinarily the rule would

have the same effect in trover ,but there seems to be
an exceptionfor in trover the conversion may be established by demand and refusal,and in such a case the
(a)

(b)

Cases in preceeding note,and Kelly vs Mclbnald,
39 Ark.387;Dorsey vs Manlow,14 Cal.553;Coal
Co.vs Long,81 Ill..359; Scott vs Bryson,74 Ill.
420;R'y Co.vs Biggs,50 Ark.169 & 178;Stringatt
vs M,,oore,55 Iowa,88; Oviat vs Pond,29 Conn.479;
Sullivan vs
8 Bradley,263; Gravatt vs
Mugge,89 Ill .281.
2 C. & K. 789;Richardson vs Northrup,66 Barb.85
Ins .Co .vs ConardJ Bald.138; Braman vs Johnson
19 Me.361.
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time of refusal would be the time of the conversion;
at which time the value would be estimated

,so

that if

the value has been enhanced between the actual physical conversion and the demand and refusal,the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover the enhanced value in
ver(a) ,but not in

trespass(b) .

But that rule applies only in
where the conversion is
fusal.

So in

tro-

those cases

established by denand and re-

Bank vs Boyd(c) ,where the plaintiff's

bonds were stolen,the time of conversion was held to
be the time of the theft and not the time of demand and
refusal.
In that class of cases where the defendant
or prior convertors have increased the value of the
chattel after the actual

conversion,there is

a conflict

of opinion as to whether the plaintiff may recover the
increased value.

The majokity of the

decisions on

this point make no distinction as to the form of the
(a)
(b)
(c)

Dowes vs Bank ,91 U. S. 618; Trans .Co .vs
Sellick,52 Ill .249.
Ante,p.
44 Md.47; King vs Dam,6 All .298.
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action ,and hold that where there are no questions of
wilfull wrong or severance from the realty involved,
the value at the time of the conversion is
rule Wa)

.

Some of the courts ,as in

the correct

Iowa for instance,

disregard the distinction as to severance from the realty and hold in

both actions that if

was innocent the plaintiff

the trespass

is not entitled to the enhan-

ced value consequent upon the defendant's labor(b) , but
when the trespass is

wilfull the enhanced value may be

recovered(c).
The question of severance from the realty
enters into a number of cases in

trover and trespass

and the decisions conflict a great deal,rendering it
difficult to determine the proper rule,hence a few
remarks upon it

here wouldperhsps,be proper.

The early English rule was that in
or trover,the plaintiff

might in

trespass

all cases recover the

value of the property as a chattel,that is,after

its

severance from the realty,thus giving to the plaintiff
(a)
(b)
(c)

Sedgewick on Damagesvol.ii,p.78,sec.499.,
and cases there cited.
Stringatt vs Moore,55 Iowa,88;and cases under
(c) below.
Chaberlain vs
45 Iowa ,429.
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the value of the defendant's labor in
property from the realty(a).

separating the

Subsequent to this de-

cision,there was considerable conflict of opinion as to
whether the same rule applied as well to an innocent
trespasser as to a wilfull wrongdoer.
ally settled in

the

This was fin-

case of Livingstone vs Coal Co.,

in the House of Lords(b),wrherein Lord Blackburn distinguished between an innocent and a wilful trespasser
and laid down the rule briefly as follows:
trespasser is

a wilful wrongdoer,he is

'Then the

liable for the

value of the property after severance,that is,as
chattel;

but "if

a

the ':rrongdoer has acted innocently and

ignorantly ,without negli -ence ,then you should consider
the mischief that has really been done to the plaintiff
who
it

lost it(speaking of coal mined and converted) while
was part of the rock,and therefore you should not

consider its

value when it

had been severed from the

rock,but you should treat it
fair

price if

at what would have been a

the wrongdoer had bought it

while it

was

yet a portion of the rock as you would buy a coal field"'.
(a)

Martin vs Porter,5 I.I.& W. 352.

(b)

5 App .Ca.25,39

.
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The rule of Martin vs Porter(a),was at first
followed in

Ne w York(b) ,and is

other jurisdictions(c) ,
measure of damages is

now followed in

some

the cases holding that the

the same in

trover as in

trespass

namnely,the value as a chattel after severance,deducting
nothing for the defendant's

labor in

converting it

into

a chattel(d).
In

some other jurisdictions the rule is

upon the ancient
in

based

distinction in forms, the plaintiff

trover being allowed to recover the value as a

chattel,

while in

trespass he recove rs the value

before severance.
do case(e) ,'in

So the court says in

a Colora-

trespass damages for the w-hole injury

including the diriunition in the value of the land as
well as the value of the property may be recovered,and
the character of the entry whether Jilfull
cious ,or in

good faith,is

or mali-

an irnportant element that

cannot enter into the action of trover.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Ante,p.35,note (a) .
Brown vs Sax,7 Cow .95.
Coal Co. vs Long,81 Ill.359.
Coal Co. vs Lennon,91 Ill .561, and Ry Co.
vs Nagle,82 III.621;
Coal Co. vs Mc~Iillan,49

11d.549 ,and Coal Co. vs McCulloch 4 59 1.1d.403;
(e)

Bly vs United States,4 Dillon,464; Smith vs
Gonder,22 Ga.253;Ellis vs Wire,33 Ind.127;
Coal Co.,vs Tabor,18 Colo.41;Skinner vs Pinney
19 Fla.42;Foote vs Merrill,54 N.H.490.
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But by the prevailing view,the defendant is he
acted in
that is

good faith,is

allowed the value of his labor,

to say,the measure of d.mages is

the value of

the property imnmediately before severance(a).

The

rule and the reasoning supporting it are well stated in
Dbrsyth vs Wells(b) ,which was an action of trover for
the conversion of coal by the defendant.

The court

says(omitting parts of the opinion,which is

quite long)

"the plaintiff

insists

that because the action is

lowed for the coal as personal property,that

is

al-

after

it has been mined or severed from the realty,--therefore,by a necessary logical sequence,she is entitled to
the value of the coal as it lay in the pit after it
had been mined.

It is apparent that this view would

transfer to the plaintiff all the defendant's labor in
mining the coal and thus give her more than compensation
for the injury done ....... just compensation in a certain class of cases is

the principle of the action of

trover,and a little study will show us that it is no
unyielding form,but adapts itself

to a great variety

of circumistances,.....it is continually applied in a
(a)
(b)

Sedgewick on Dam. 89;
Forsyth vs Wells,ante.
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great variety of cases to every form of wrongful conversion and of wrongful taking and conversion,and it
affords compensation not only for the value of the Joods,
but also for the outrage and malice in the taking of
them(a)

'

Further on,speaking of trespass,the

learned judge remarked:

'that the form of trespass also

yields to the purpose of the remedy(b)',and then he
goes on: "In very strict form,trespass is a proper
remedy for a wrongful taking of personal property; and
yet the trespass may be Yraived,and trover maintained
rithout giving up any claim for any outrage or violence
in

the act of taking(c) ....... but,when the law does al-

low this departure from the strict

form,it is

not to

enable the plaintiff,by his own choice of actions ,to
increase his recovery beyond just compensation,but

only

to give him a more convenient form for recovering that
nach ......... When the defendant's conduct measured by
the standard of ordinary morality and care which is
standard of the law,is not chargeable with fraud or
(a)

(b)
(c)

Dennis vs Barber ,6 S. & R. 420,426. Berry
vs Bantrees,12 S. & R. 89,93; Taylor vs
Morgan,3 Watts ,333.
McDonald vs Scaife,ll Pa.381.
Moore vs Schenck,3 Pa.St.13.

the
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violence,

or wilfull negligence or wrong,the value of

the property taken and converted is the measure of just
compensation.

If

raw material has,after appropri-

ation and without such wrong,been changed by manufacture,into a new species of property,the law either refuses the action of trover for the new article ,or limits
the recovery to the value of the original article.

This

case,as said before ,presents the general rule that where
there are no circumstances of aggravation in
and trover,the measure of damages is
this rule is

trespass

the same,and

quite generally followed(a)

The next and final question presented for
our consideration,is as to the rule,when there are such
aggravating circumstances as are mentioned in the opinion.
Most of the

cases previously cited, indicate that in

trover as well as in
be given.
(a)

trespass,

exmnplery damages may

Upon this point there is

little

differ-

Cases heretofore cited,and Goller vs Fett,
30 Cal. 481; Iron Co., vs Iron Works, 102
Mass.80; Thompson vs Moily,46 !Mch.42;
Tilden vs Johnson,52 Vt. 628; Wright vs
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ence of opinion, the rule is quite general and fails to
obtain only in

very few states(b).

We have now concluded this investigation of
the distinction between the actions of trover and tresWe have covered the most important topics

pass.

bearing upon this

point,

and those we have neglected

the reader will not miss.

(b)

Wright vs XVaddell, 56 N. W. 650; R. R. Co.
vs Kniffin, 23 3. W. 460, and cases therein
cited; Argaga vs Villaba, 85 Cal. 191;
Kennet vs Adamson,44 Minn.121; Sullivan vs
Dee, 8 Brad. 263; cases cited in note (a).

